

U.S. Department of Justice

Criminal Division

Washington, D.C. 20530

Dre-MUR390

MAR 3 0 2000

By Hand

Mr. Lawrence M. Noble General Counsel Federal Election Commission 999 E Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20463

Re: <u>United States v. Mark Nichols and Gregorio Cervantes</u>

Dear Mr. Noble:

We are forwarding herewith two checks payable to the Federal Election Commission, one for \$56,000 from Mark Nichols and the other for \$26,000 from Gregorio Cervantes, the defendants in the captioned criminal Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) cases in the Central District of California.

These checks have been tendered to us by these defendants as a consequence of global plea agreements through which they seek to satisfy simultaneously their criminal and their administrative liability for knowingly and wilfully violating FECA by laundering excessive contributions from the Cabazon Band of the Missions Indians to federal candidates through conduits, in violation of 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a, 441f and 437g(d).

We also are enclosing copies of the defendants' plea agreements, the charges to which they pleaded guilty, and a transcript of the relevant court proceedings. As indicated in these materials, defendant Nichols, the major offender, has paid a criminal fine of \$200,000 and defendant Cervantes, a lesser offender, has paid a criminal fine of \$13,000.

During our criminal investigation, we kept your office informed of the circumstances of this case and of these defendants' desire to reach a global settlement of their criminal and noncriminal FECA liability, albeit in hypothetical terms. We have also informed these defendants that the Department of Justice lacks authority to speak for the Commission in assessing

noncriminal remedies under 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a). The plea agreements we negotiated in these two cases address the possibility that the Commission may decide not to accept the proposed noncriminal fines in language we have previously used in similar cases. However, we believe that the amounts tendered by these defendants to the Commission represent reasonable and just administrative penalties. Should the Commission disagree, we request that the two checks be returned to us so that we may refund them to the defendants in accordance with the terms of their plea agreements.

Please let me know if we can assist you further in these matters.

Sincerely

Craig C. Donsanto

Director, Election Crimes Branch

Public Integrity Section

Enclosures

cc: Jeff Rawitz

Assistant United States Attorney

Los Angeles

FILED ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS United States Attorney Oct 12 11 14 AM '99 2 GEORGE S. CARDONA Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division 3 1) is sent and the sent of the JEFFREY M. RAWITZ (State Bar No. 145529) ·· 4 Assistant United States Attorney LOSSANGFLES 1300 United States Courthouse 5 312 North Spring Street Los Angeles, California 90012 (213) 894-2302 6 7 Attorney for Plaintiff United States of America 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. CR 99-642(B)-ABC 11 Plaintiff, NOTICE OF FILING OF ORIGINAL PLEA AGREEMENT 12 13 MARK NICHOLS, 14 Defendant. 15 16 Plaintiff United States of America hereby files notice of 17 filing of original Plea Agreement in the above-titled case. 18 Dated: October 12, 1999 Respectfully submitted, 19 ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS United States Attorney 20 GEORGE S. CARDONA 21 Assistant United States Attorney 22 Chief, Criminal Division 23 RAWITZ 24 Assistant United States Attorney 25 Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America 26 27

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PLEA AGREEMENT

United States v. Mark Nichols, CR 99-642(B)-ABC

INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH

1. This constitutes the plea agreement between defendant Mark Nichols (hereinafter "defendant") and the United States Attorney's Office for the Central District of California ("this Office") in <u>United States v. Mark Nichols et. al.</u>, CR 98-642(B)-ABC. The terms of the agreement are as follows:

PLEA

- 2. Defendant agrees to plead guilty to counts one through three of the Second Superseding Information (the "Information"), a copy of which is attached to this agreement as Exhibit A. The Second Superseding Information charges defendant with three counts of violating Title 2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f) and 437g(d); and Title 18 U.S.C. § 2, by causing the making of illegal conduit campaign contributions.
- 3. The plea will be pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(c). If the Court does not accept this 11(e)(1)(C) agreement, then neither party is bound by this agreement and it will be deemed null and void.

NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

4. In order to be guilty of violating 2 U.S.C. §§
441(f) and 437(d); and 18 U.S.C. § 2, defendant must have: (1)
knowingly and wilfully (2) made, or caused to be made, a
contribution in connection with an election to any federal
political office or in connection with any primary election,
convention, or caucus held to select candidates for any federal

political office, (3) in the name of another person, (4) with said illegal contributions aggregating \$2,000 or more during the calendar year. By signing this agreement, defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of these offenses. Furthermore, defendant specifically agrees to the factual basis for the plea which is attached to this agreement.

PENALTIES

- 5. The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for each count of conviction under 2 U.S.C. §§ 441f and 437g(d); and 16 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3) is one year incarceration, an additional one year of supervised release, a fine of \$100,000, and a special assessment of \$25 for each count of conviction or five years probation, a fine of \$100,000 per count, and a special assessment of \$25 for each count of conviction. The Court can also order defendant to pay the costs of defendant's imprisonment should the court impose any. Defendant agrees to pay the special assessment at or before the time of sentencing.
- 6. If defendant is placed on supervised release following imprisonment and defendant violates one or more of the conditions of supervised release, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above. This paragraph is included to ensure that defendant is fully advised of the maximum statutory penalties. Under the terms of this agreement,

defendant cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment or supervised release.

AGREED ON SENTENCING FACTORS AND FINE AMOUNT

7. Applicable Guideline

The parties agree and stipulate that the applicable guideline is U.S.S.G § 2X5.1 because there is no United States Sentencing Guideline that is sufficiently analogous for the offense described in 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d). The parties further stipulate that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) shall control the fines applicable to the offenses described in this plea agreement.

8. Criminal Fine

The parties agree that as part of his sentence defendant shall be ordered to pay a total criminal fine in the amount of \$200,000, payable as follows: The first payment shall be in the amount of \$118,000.00 and shall be tendered at the time of the imposition of sentence. The second payment of \$82,000.00 shall be within twenty-four months after the first payment is tendered. Payments shall be in the form of a cashier's check made payable to the United States. Failure of defendant to make the payments required as part of the agreed-upon sentence shall (1) constitute a breach of this agreement allowing this Office to reinstate the underlying First Superseding Indictment with the statute of limitations having been tolled for the period between the signing of this agreement and the reinstatement of the First Superseding Indictment, and (2) constitute a violation of defendant's

probation.

9. Resolution of Administrative and Civil Liabilities with the Federal Election Commission

Defendant admits that his conduct knowingly and wilfully violated 2 U.S.C. § 441(f) of the Federal Election Campaign Act, and that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has exclusive authority to seek civil remedies against him for those violations pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g a)(5).

Defendant agrees to submit to the FEC's jurisdiction, to cooperate with the FEC in its compliance proceedings against defendant, including waiving FEC notification procedures to which he may be entitled, all evidentiary privileges, and any statute of limitations which may be applicable to the FEC compliance proceedings, and to enter into a conciliation agreement with the FEC and to pay whatever civil penalty the FEC deems appropriate pursuant to the provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5). This Office and defendant have agreed that an administrative and civil fine of \$56,000 would be an appropriate civil disposition of this matter before the FEC in view of the charged conduct and the conditions of this plea agreement. However, defendant has been advised that this part of the plea agreement is not binding on the FEC.

Defendant agrees to tender a check in the amount of \$56,000

Should the FEC impose a fine in excess of \$56,000.00 for the offense conduct charges in the First Superseding Indictment, the amount in excess of \$56,000 shall be credited against defendant's obligation to make criminal fine payments as discussed in paragraph 8 herein.

made payable to the FEC at the time of the imposition of sentence. This Office agrees to forward this check to the FEC, along with a copy of this agreement and its recommendation.

In the event that the FEC should accept the proposed sum as an appropriate noncriminal remedy for the FECA violations admitted in this agreement, after a conciliation agreement has been entered into by defendant with the FEC, and a check has been tendered and accepted by the FEC, no further proceedings (either criminal or administrative) other than those associated with the implementation of this plea agreement shall be undertaken against defendant by this Office, the Department of Justice, or the FEC for the FECA violations admitted in this agreement.

However, in the event that the FEC should refuse to accept this sum as an appropriate noncriminal remedy for the FECA violations admitted in this agreement, the check will be returned to defendant, and the issue of the amount of the appropriate administrative remedy shall be determined exclusively by the FEC through the conciliation process in 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5).

10. Probation

The parties agree that: (1) defendant shall not be sentenced to a period of imprisonment, although imprisonment may be ordered as a condition of probation; (2) defendant shall be sentenced to no less than three years of probation; (3) the government retains the right to argue for, and the court shall have the right to impose a sentence including a period of up to five years probation; and (4) the government retains the right to argue for,

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and the court shall have the right to include as a condition of the probationary sentence to be imposed, any of the discretionary conditions listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) including but not limited to imprisonment by the Bureau of Prisons for a period of not to exceed one year consistent with the dictates of 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(10).

11. Forfeiture

The parties agree that no forfeiture should be ordered as part of the criminal sentence.

12. Special Assessment

Defendant agrees to pay to the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the date of sentencing a mandatory special assessment of \$25.00 for each count.

FACTUAL BASIS

13. Defendant and this Office agree and stipulate to the statement of facts attached hereto and incorporated herein.

CONSIDERATION BY OFFICE

14. This Office, in exchange for defendant's guilty plea and complete fulfillment of all of defendant's obligations under this agreement, agrees that it will at the time of sentencing dismiss the underlying Indictment and First Superseding Indictment.

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

15. Defendant understands that by pleading guilty, defendant will be giving up the following Constitutional rights:

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Defendant has the right to plead not guilty and the right to be tried by a jury or a court if defendant waives defendant's right to a jury trial. At a trial, defendant would have the right to the assistance of counsel. During the trial, defendant would be presumed innocent and a jury would be instructed that the burden of proof is on the government to prove defendant quilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant would have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant. If defendant wishes, defendant could present evidence and or testify. On the other hand, if defendant did not wish to testify or present evidence, that fact could not be used against defendant and a jury would be so instructed. Defendant would also have the right to call witnesses on defendant's behalf. By pleading guilty, defendant will be giving up all of these rights. Defendant also will be giving up the right to pursue any pre-trial motions that were or could have been brought.

WAIVER OF APPEAL

- 16. Defendant understands that Title 18, United States
 Code, Section 3742 gives defendant the right to appeal the
 sentence imposed by the Court. Acknowledging this, defendant
 knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to appeal any sentence
 imposed by the Court so long as the sentence is within the
 statutory maximum authorized by law and comports with the
 sentence set forth in this agreement.
- 17. The government likewise agrees to waive its right to appeal the sentence imposed by the Court so long as it comports

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with the sentence set forth in this agreement.

18. This agreement is limited to defendant and this Office and cannot bind any other federal, state or local prosecuting, administrative or regulatory authorities, except as set forth in paragraph 9 above.

NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

19. Except as expressly set forth herein, there are no additional promises, understandings or agreements between this Office or any other government office and defendant or defendant's counsel concerning any other criminal prosecution, civil litigation or administrative proceeding relating to any other federal, state or local charges that may now be pending or hereafter be brought against defendant, or the sentence that might be imposed as a result of defendant's guilty pleas pursuant to this Agreement. Nor may any additional agreement,

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understanding or condition be entered into unless in writing and signed by all parties.

If a fully executed copy of this agreement is not returned to me by September 23, 1999, it will be automatically withdrawn and thereafter of no legal effect or force.

This agreement shall be effective upon execution by defendant and this Office.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS United States Attorney

JEFFREY M. BANTEZ

Assistant United States Attorney

Public Corruption & Government Fraud Section

 $\frac{9/29/99}{\text{Date}}$

9 (30 /99

Date

STANLEY GREENBERG

Counse of Defendant

Mark Nichols

MARK NICHOI Defendant

FACTUAL BASIS

The Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") governs contributions to candidates and their campaign committees in federal elections. Under FECA, it is illegal for one person to (a) contribute more than \$1000 to a particular candidate in either the primary or general federal election, or (b) make a contribution in the name of another or, in other words, to make disguised contributions through a "conduit" contributor.

Under FECA, the Federal Elections Commission ("FEC") is the agency of the United States responsible for: (a) receiving the required campaign contribution and disbursement reports, (b) making these reports available to the public, and (c) investigating violations of the law concerning illegal campaign contributions to federal candidates.

Under FECA, a candidate for federal office must establish a political committee through which funds can be raised. The treasurer of a federal candidate's political committee is required to file a periodic report with the FEC disclosing, among other things, the name of each contributor who contributed more than \$200 during the reporting period, and the amount of their contribution. Federal law requires these reports to be made available to the public throughout the campaign and thereafter.

Defendant MARK NICHOLS was Chief Executive Officer of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians in Riverside County, California (the "Tribe"). In this capacity, defendant MARK NICHOLS supervised employees of the Tribe, including employees of the Fantasy Springs Casino, which was owned and operated by the Tribe.

President William Jefferson Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., were candidates for President and Vice President of the United States during the campaign preceding the 1996 federal election. "The Clinton/Gore '96 Primary Committee" ("Clinton/Gore Committee") was a political committee authorized to support their candidacies, and the committee was subject to the reporting provisions and the campaign financing limitations of FECA.

Beginning in or about 1994 and continuing through December 12, 1995, defendant Nichols engaged in a scheme to knowingly and willfully cause the Tribe to circumvent the campaign contributions limits imposed by the FECA, by using the Tribe's money to make conduit contributions through various members, or employees, of the Tribe (the "conduits"). The manner in which this scheme was effectuated was to encourage the conduits to make contributions to a candidate with the understanding that they would be reimbursed for their contributions by the Tribe.

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Defendant Nichols would make the reimbursement payments by issuing the conduits "bonuses", or "loans" which were subsequently forgiven.

Specifically, defendant knowingly and willfully caused the following conduit contributions to be made in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441(f) and 437g(d)

The Donald and Elaine Goodman Contributions

On or about June 15, 1995, defendant MARK NICHOLS caused Donald Goodman to issue check nos. 978 for \$1,000 to "Clinton/Gore '96". This check was drawn on the bank account of Donald Goodman at Home Savings of America, account

On or about June 15, 1995, defendant MARK NICHOLS caused Elaine Goodman to issue check nos. 979 for \$1,000 to "Clinton/Gore '96". This check was drawn account at Home Savings of America.

On or about June 20, 1995, defendant MARK NICHOLS caused the Tribe to issue Donald Goodman check nos. 863 in the amount of \$10,000 ("check nos. 863") as reimbursement for the June 15, 1995 \$1,000 checks issued by Donald and Elaine Goodman to Clinton/Gore '96.

On or about June 24, 1995, Donald Goodman deposited check "863" into his account at Home Savings of America.

<u>Defendant GREG CERVANTES'S Contribution (Count One)</u>

On or about June 17, 1995, defendant GREG CERVANTES issued check nos. 92 for \$1,000 to "Clinton/Gore '96". This check was drawn on the joint bank account of Gregorio and Hortencia Cervantes at First Interstate Bank, account nos.

On or about June 19, 1995, defendant MARK NICHOLS caused the Tribe to issue defendant GREG CERVANTES check number nos. 14080 in the amount of \$4,000 ("check nos. 14080") which was to be used in part to reimburse defendant GREG CERVANTES for the above described contribution.

On or about June 20, 1995, defendant GREG CERVANTES took check nos. 14080 to First Interstate Bank in Indio, California and deposited \$2,000 into Cervantes account nos. A \$1,000 of this deposit was made to reimburse defendant GREG CERVANTES for his \$1,000 contribution made to Clinton/Gore '96.

The David and AnnMarie Riemer Contributions (Counts Two and Three)

On or about June 29, 1995, defendant MARK NICHOLS caused David Riemer to issue check nos. 2272 for \$1,000 to "Clinton/Gore '96". This check was drawn on the joint bank account held in the names of David Riemer and AnnMarie Riemer at Bank of America, account nos.

On or about September 15, 1995, defendant MARK NICHOLS caused AnnMarie Riemer to issue check nos. 2401 for \$1,000 to "Clinton/Gore '96". This check was drawn on account nos. at Bank of America.

On or about September 19, 1995, defendant MARK NICHOLS caused the Tribe to issue David Riemer check nos. 37563 in the amount of \$2,000 ("check nos. 37563") as reimbursement for David Riemer's June 29, and AnneMarie Riemer's September 15, \$1,000 checks to Clinton/Gore '96.

On or about September 19, 1995, David Riemer deposited check nos. 37563 into account at Bank of America.

Other Conduit Contributions

Between October, 1994, and December 1995, defendant Nichols cased the Tribe to make at least 28 conduit contributions in the above described manner, usually in \$1,000 amounts, to various candidates for the United States House of Representatives and United States Senate, knowing that such conduct constituted a violation of 2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f) and 437d(G).

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CENTRAL DIST. OF GALIF.

CONTRAL DIST. OF GALIF.

LOS ANGELES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

V.

MARK NICHOLS and
GREGORIO CERVANTES,
aka Greg Cervantes,

Defendants.

CR 98-642(B)-ABC

SECOND
SUPERSEDING
INFORMATION

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d): Illegal
Conduit Campaign Contributions; 18
U.S.C. § 2: Causing an Act to be Done]

The United States Attorney charges:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

At all times relevant to the Second Superseding Information:

1. The Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") governs contributions to candidates and their campaign committees in federal elections. Under FECA, it is illegal for one person to (a) contribute more than \$1000 to a particular candidate in either the primary or general federal election, or (b) make a contribution in the name of another or, in other words, to make disguised contributions through a "conduit" contributor.

27 JMR:jmr

- 2. Under FECA, the Federal Elections Commission ("FEC") is the agency of the United States responsible for: (a) receiving the required campaign contribution and disbursement reports, (b) making these reports available to the public, and (c) investigating violations of the law concerning illegal campaign contributions to federal candidates.
- 3. Under FECA, a candidate for federal office must establish a political committee through which funds can be raised. The treasurer of a federal candidate's political committee is required to file a periodic report with the FEC disclosing, among other things, the name of each contributor who contributed more than \$200 during the reporting period, and the amount of their contribution. Federal law requires these reports to be made available to the public throughout the campaign and thereafter.
- 4. Defendant MARK NICHOLS was Chief Executive Officer of the Cabazon Band of Missions Indians in Riverside County, California (the "Tribe"). In this capacity, defendant MARK NICHOLS supervised employees of the Tribe, including employees of the Fantasy Springs Casino, which was owned and operated by the Tribe.
- Defendant GREG CERVANTES was Customer Service Representative of the
 Tribe in Riverside County, California.
- 6. President William Jefferson Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., were candidates for President and Vice President of the United States during the campaign preceding the 1996 federal election. "The Clinton/Gore '96 Primary Committee" ("Clinton/Gore Committee") was a political committee authorized to support their candidacies, and the committee was subject to the reporting provisions and the campaign financing limitations of FECA.

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COUNT ONE

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about June 17, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant MARK NICHOLS knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about June 16, 1995, defendant NICHOLS, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in Greg Cervantes's name.

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COUNT TWO

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about June 29, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant MARK NICHOLS knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about June 29, 1995, defendant NICHOLS, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in David Riemer's name.

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COUNT THREE

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about September 20, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant MARK NICHOLS knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about September 20, 1995, defendant NICHOLS, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in Anne Riemer's name.

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COUNT FOUR

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about June 17, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant GREG CERVANTES knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about July 27, 1995, defendant CERVANTES, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in Beartice Cervantes's name.

ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS United States Attorney

GEORGE S. CARDONA Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division

KIMBERLY A. DUNNE Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Public Corruption & Government Fraud Section

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,) CR 98-642(B)-ABC
Plaintiff, v.) SECOND) SUPERSEDING) INFORMATION
MARK NICHOLS and GREGORIO CERVANTES, aka Greg Cervantes, Defendants.	[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d): Illegal Conduit Campaign Contributions; 18 U.S.C. § 2: Causing an Act to be Done]

The United States Attorney charges:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

At all times relevant to the Second Superseding Information:

1. The Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") governs contributions to candidates and their campaign committees in federal elections. Under FECA, it is illegal for one person to (a) contribute more than \$1000 to a particular candidate in either the primary or general federal election, or (b) make a contribution in the name of another or, in other words, to make disguised contributions through a "conduit" contributor.

27 JMR:jmr

- 2. Under FECA, the Federal Elections Commission ("FEC") is the agency of the United States responsible for: (a) receiving the required campaign contribution and disbursement reports, (b) making these reports available to the public, and (c) investigating violations of the law concerning illegal campaign contributions to federal candidates.
- 3. Under FECA, a candidate for federal office must establish a political committee through which funds can be raised. The treasurer of a federal candidate's political committee is required to file a periodic report with the FEC disclosing, among other things, the name of each contributor who contributed more than \$200 during the reporting period, and the amount of their contribution. Federal law requires these reports to be made available to the public throughout the campaign and thereafter.
- 4. Defendant MARK NICHOLS was Chief Executive Officer of the Cabazon Band of Missions Indians in Riverside County, California (the "Tribe"). In this capacity, defendant MARK NICHOLS supervised employees of the Tribe, including employees of the Fantasy Springs Casino, which was owned and operated by the Tribe.
- Defendant GREG CERVANTES was Customer Service Representative of the
 Tribe in Riverside County, California.
- 6. President William Jefferson Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., were candidates for President and Vice President of the United States during the campaign preceding the 1996 federal election. "The Clinton/Gore '96 Primary Committee" ("Clinton/Gore Committee") was a political committee authorized to support their candidacies, and the committee was subject to the reporting provisions and the campaign financing limitations of FECA.

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COUNT ONE

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about June 17, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant MARK NICHOLS knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about June 16, 1995, defendant NICHOLS, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in Greg Cervantes's name.

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COUNT TWO

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about June 29, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant MARK NICHOLS knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about June 29, 1995, defendant NICHOLS, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in David Riemer's name.

COUNT THREE

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about September 20, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant MARK NICHOLS knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about September 20, 1995, defendant NICHOLS, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in Anne Riemer's name.

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COUNT FOUR

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about June 17, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant GREG CERVANTES knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about July 27, 1995, defendant CERVANTES, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in Beartice Cervantes's name.

ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS United States Attorney

GEORGE S. CARDONA Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division

KIMBERLY A. DUNNE
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Public Corruption & Government Fraud
Section

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, VERONICA BARAJAS, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or employed in Los Angeles County, California; that my business address is Office of United States Attorney, United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012; that I am over the age of eighteen years, and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for the Central District of California who is a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, at whose direction the service by mail described in this certificate was made; that on October 12, 1999, I deposited in the United States mail in the United States Courthouse at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, in the aboveentitled action, in an envelope bearing the requisite postage, a copy of:

NOTICE OF FILING OF ORIGINAL PLEA AGREEMENT

Addressed to: STANLEY GREENBERG, ESQ.

11845 West Olympic Blvd.

Suite 1000

Los Angeles, CA 90064

at his/her/their last known address, at which place there is a delivery service by United States mail

This Certificate is executed on October 12, 1999, at Los Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

VERONICA BARATAC

	•	C 11	
1	II	FILED	
2	United States Attorney GEORGE S. CARDONA	,	
3	Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division	11 TH HI 33	
	TEFFREY M RAWITZ (State Bar No.	145529) FOR ASSESSMENT COURT	
4	1300 United States Courthou	LOS ANGELES	
5	312 North Spring Street Los Angeles, California 90	012	
6			
7	II		
8	United States of America		
9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
	FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
LO	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	No. CR 99-642(B)-ABC	
11	Plaintiff,)	NOTICE OF FILING OF	
L2	v. ,	ORIGINAL PLEA AGREEMENT	
L3	GREGORIO CERVANTES,)		
L4)		
L 5	Defendant.)		
L6			
L 7		America hereby files notice of	
18	filing of original Plea Agreemen	it in the above-titled case.	
19	Dated: October 12, 1999 Re	espectfully submitted,	
20	AI.	EJANDRO N. MAYORKAS lited States Attorney	
l	·		
21	As	CORGE S. CARDONA sistant United States Attorney	
22	Ch	nief, Criminal Division	
23			
24		EFFREY M. RAWITZ	
25		sestant United States Attorney	
26		Attorneys for Plaintiff United States of America	
27			

PLEA AGREEMENT

United States v. Gregorio Cervantes, CR 99-642(B)-ABC

INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH

1. This constitutes the plea agreement between defendant Gregorio Cervantes (hereinafter "defendant") and the United States Attorney's Office for the Central District of California ("this Office") in <u>United States v. Gergorio Cervantes et. al.</u>, CR 98-642(B)-ABC. The terms of the agreement are as follows:

PLEA

- 2. Defendant agrees to plead guilty to count four of the Second Superseding Information (the "Information"), a copy of which is attached to this agreement as Exhibit A. Count four of the Information charges defendant with violating Title 2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f) and 437g(d); and Title 18 U.S.C. § 2, by causing the making of illegal conduit campaign contributions.
- 3. The plea will be pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(c). If the Court does not accept this 11(e)(1)(C) agreement, then neither party is bound by this agreement and it will be deemed null and void.

NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

4. In order to be guilty of violating 2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f) and 437(d); and 18 U.S.C. § 2, defendant must have: (1) knowingly and wilfully (2) made, or caused to be made, a contribution in connection with an election to any federal political office or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for any federal political office, (3) in the name of another person, (4) with

said illegal contributions aggregating \$2,000 or more during the calendar year. By signing this agreement, defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, guilty of this offense. Furthermore, defendant specifically agrees to the factual basis for the plea which is attached to this agreement.

PENALTIES

- 5. The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a conviction under 2 U.S.C. §§ 441f and 437g(d); and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3) is one year incarceration; an additional one year of supervised release; a fine of \$100,000; and a special assessment of \$25 or five years probation; a fine of \$100,000; and a special assessment of \$25. The Court can also order defendant to pay the costs of defendant's imprisonment. Defendant agrees to pay the special assessment at or before the time of sentencing.
- 6. If defendant is placed on supervised release following imprisonment and defendant violates one or more of the conditions of supervised release, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above.

AGREED ON SENTENCE

7. Applicable Guideline

The parties agree and stipulate that the applicable guideline is U.S.S.G § 2X5.1 because there is no United States Sentencing Guideline that is sufficiently analogous for the

offense described in 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d). The parties further stipulate that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) shall control the fines applicable to the offenses described in this plea agreement.

8. Fine

The parties agree that as part of his sentence defendant shall be ordered to pay a total criminal fine in the amount of \$13,000. The payment shall be tendered within one year of the the imposition of sentence and made in the form of a cashier's check payable to the United States. Failure of defendant to make the payments required as part of the agreed-upon sentence shall (1) constitute a breach of this agreement allowing this Office to reinstate the underlying First Superseding Indictment with the statute of limitations having been tolled for the period between the signing of this agreement and the reinstatement of the First Superseding Indictment, and (2) constitute a violation of defendant's probation.

9. Resolution of Administrative and Civil Liabilities with the Federal Election Commission

Defendant admits that his conduct knowingly and willfully violated 2 U.S.C. § 441(f) of the Federal Election Campaign Act, and that the Federal Election Commission (FEC) has exclusive authority to seek civil remedies against him for those violations pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5).

Defendant agrees to submit to the FEC's jurisdiction, to cooperate with the FEC in its compliance proceedings against

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defendant, including waiving FEC notification procedures to which he may be entitled, all evidentiary privileges, and any statute of limitations which may be applicable to the FEC compliance proceedings, and to enter into a conciliation agreement with the FEC and to pay whatever civil penalty the FEC deems appropriate pursuant to the provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5). This Office and defendant have agreed that an administrative and civil fine of \$26,000 would be an appropriate civil disposition of this matter before the FEC in view of the charged conduct and the conditions of this plea agreement. However, defendant has been advised that this part of the plea agreement is not binding on the FEC.

Defendant agrees to tender a check in the amount of \$26,000 made payable to the FEC at the time defendant enters his plea of guilty before the court. This Office agrees to forward this check to the FEC, along with a copy of this agreement and its recommendation.

In the event that the FEC should accept the proposed sum as an appropriate noncriminal remedy for the FECA violations admitted in this agreement, after a conciliation agreement has been entered into by defendant with the FEC, and a check has been tendered and accepted by the FEC, no further proceedings (either criminal or administrative) other than those associated with the implementation of this plea agreement shall be undertaken against defendant by this Office, the Department of Justice, or the FEC for the FECA violations admitted in this agreement.

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However, in the event that the FEC should refuse to accept this sum as an appropriate noncriminal remedy for the FECA violations admitted in this agreement, the check will be returned to defendant, and the issue of the amount of the appropriate administrative remedy shall be determined exclusively by the FEC through the conciliation process in 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5).

10. <u>Incarceration, Community Confinement Center, Home</u> Detention and Community Service

The parties agree that defendant shall not be sentenced to any term of incarceration, confinement in a community confinement center, home detention or community service.

11. Probation

The parties agree that defendant shall be placed on one year of probation as part of his sentence in this case.

12. Forfeiture

The parties agree that no forfeiture should be ordered as part of the criminal sentence.

13. Special Assessment

Defendant agrees to pay to the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Central District of California on the date of sentencing a mandatory special assessment of \$25.00.

FACTUAL BASIS

14. Defendant and this Office agree and stipulate to the statement of facts attached hereto and incorporated herein.

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CONSIDERATION BY OFFICE

15. This Office, in exchange for defendant's guilty plea and complete fulfillment of all of defendant's obligations under this agreement, agrees that it will at the time of sentencing dismiss the underlying Indictment and First Superseding Indictment.

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Defendant understands that by pleading guilty, 16. defendant will be giving up the following Constitutional rights: Defendant has the right to plead not quilty and the right to be tried by a jury or a court if defendant waives defendant's right to a jury trial. At a trial, defendant would have the right to the assistance of counsel. During the trial, defendant would be presumed innocent and a jury would be instructed that the burden of proof is on the government to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant would have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against defendant. If defendant wishes, defendant could present evidence and or testify. On the other hand, if defendant did not wish to testify or present evidence, that fact could not be used against defendant and a jury would be so instructed. Defendant would also have the right to call witnesses on defendant's behalf. By pleading guilty, defendant will be giving up all of these rights. Defendant also will be giving up the right to pursue any pre-trial motions that were or could have been brought.

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WAIVER OF APPEAL

- 17. Defendant understands that Title 18, United States
 Code, Section 3742 gives defendant the right to appeal the
 sentence imposed by the Court. Acknowledging this, defendant
 knowingly and voluntarily waives the right to appeal any sentence
 imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is
 determined, so long as the sentence is within the statutory
 maximum authorized by law and comports with the sentence set
 forth in this agreement.
- 18. The government likewise agrees to waive its right to appeal the sentence imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined so long as it comports with the sentence set forth in this agreement.
- 19. This agreement is limited to defendant and this Office and cannot bind any other federal, state or local prosecuting, administrative or regulatory authorities, except as set forth in paragraph 9 above.

NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

20. Except as expressly set forth herein, there are no additional promises, understandings or agreements between this Office or any other government office and defendant or defendant's counsel concerning any other criminal prosecution, civil litigation or administrative proceeding relating to any other federal, state or local charges that may now be pending or hereafter be brought against defendant, or the sentence that might be imposed as a result of defendant's guilty pleas pursuant

to this Agreement. Nor may any additional agreement, understanding or condition be entered into unless in writing and signed by all parties.

If a fully executed copy of this agreement is not returned to me by September 23, 1999, it will be automatically withdrawn and thereafter of no legal effect or force.

This agreement shall be effective upon execution by defendant and this Office.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS United States Attorney

JEFFREY M. RAWITZ

Assistant United States Attorney

Public Corruption & Government Fraud Section

as of 9/22/99

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Date

ROBERT CORBIN

Defendant

Counsel for Defendant

Greg Cervantes

FACTUAL BASIS

The Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") governs contributions to candidates and their campaign committees in federal elections. Under FECA, it is illegal for one person to (a) contribute more than \$1000 to a particular candidate in either the primary or general federal election, or (b) make a contribution in the name of another or, in other words, to make disguised contributions through a "conduit" contributor.

Under FECA, the Federal Elections Commission ("FEC") is the agency of the United States responsible for: (a) receiving the required campaign contribution and disbursement reports, (b) making these reports available to the public, and (c) investigating violations of the law concerning illegal campaign contributions to federal candidates.

Under FECA, a candidate for federal office must establish a political committee through which funds can be raised. The treasurer of a federal candidate's political committee is required to file a periodic report with the FEC disclosing, among other things, the name of each contributor who contributed more than \$200 during the reporting period, and the amount of their contribution. Federal law requires these reports to be made available to the public throughout the campaign and thereafter.

Defendant MARK NICHOLS was Chief Executive Officer of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians in Riverside County, California (the "Tribe"). In this capacity, defendant MARK NICHOLS supervised employees of the Tribe, including employees of the Fantasy Springs Casino, which was owned and operated by the Tribe.

Defendant GREG CERVANTES was Customer Service Representative of the Tribe in Riverside County, California.

President William Jefferson Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., were candidates for President and Vice President of the United States during the campaign preceding the 1996 federal election. "The Clinton/Gore '96 Primary Committee" ("Clinton/Gore Committee") was a political committee authorized to support their candidacies, and the committee was subject to the reporting provisions and the campaign financing limitations of FECA.

Beginning in or about October, 1994 and continuing through July 27, 1995, defendant Cervantes in concert with co-conspirator Nichols engaged in a scheme to knowingly and wilfully cause the Tribe to circumvent the campaign contributions limits imposed by the FECA, by using the Tribe's money to make conduit

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contributions through defendant Cervantes' family members (the "conduits").

The manner in which this scheme was effectuated was that defendant Cervantes would encourage the conduits to make contributions to a candidate with the understanding that they would be reimbursed for their contributions by the Tribe. manner in which the reimbursements would occur is that within a few days of the conduits making the contribution, co-conspirator Nichols would cause the Tribe to issue either a "bonus" check or a "loan" to defendant Cervantes, who in turn would reimburse the conduits.

Specifically, defendant Cervantes knowingly and willfully caused the following conduit contributions to be made in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441(f) and 437q(d):

The Greg and Hortencia Cervantes Contributions

On or about June 17, 1995, defendant GREG CERVANTES issued check nos. 92 for \$1,000 to "Clinton/Gore '96". This check was drawn on the joint bank account of Gregorio and Hortencia Cervantes at First Interstate Bank, account nos.

On or about June 17, 1995, defendant GREG CERVANTES caused Hortencia Cervantes to issue check nos. 93 for \$1,000 to 14 "Clinton/Gore '96". This check was drawn on account nos. at First Interstate Bank.

On or about June 19, 1995, defendant MARK NICHOLS caused the Tribe to issue defendant GREG CERVANTES check number nos. 14080 in the amount of \$4,000 ("check nos. 14080") a portion of which was to be used to reimburse defendant GREG CERVANTES and Hortencia Cervantes for the described above contributions.

On or about June 20, 1995, defendant GREG CERVANTES took check 14080 to First Interstate Bank in Indio, California and put \$2,000 into Cervantes account nos. This deposit was made to reimburse the defendant GREG CERVANTES and Hortencia Cervantes for their \$1,000 contributions made to Clinton/Gore

The Beartice Cervantes Contribution

On or about July 25, 1995, defendant GREG CERVANTES caused his sister Beartice Cervantes to issue check number 362 for \$1,000 to "Clinton/Gore '96 Primary." This check was drawn on First Interstate bank account number

On or about July 26, 1995, defendant MARK NICHOLS caused the Tribe to issue defendant GREG CERVANTES check number 14493 for \$2,000. \$1,000 of this check was to be used to reimburse

Beartice Cervantes for the above described contribution.

On or about July 27, 1995, defendant GERG CERVANTES deposited \$1,000 in cash into Beartice Cervantes First Interstate bank account number Defendant GREG CERVANTES made the deposit to reimburse Beartice Cervantes for her July 25, 1995 \$1,000 contribution to "Clinton/Gore '96 Primary," and used the proceeds of the Tribe's check number 14493 given to him by defendant MARK NICHOLS.

Other Conduit Contributions

Between October, 1994, and July 1995, defendant Cervantes caused the Tribe to make at least 13 conduit contributions in the above described manner, usually in \$1,000 amounts, to various candidates for the United States House of Representatives and United States Senate, knowing that such conduct constituted a violation of 2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f) and 437d(G).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,) CR 98-642(B)-ABC
Plaintiff, v.	SECOND SUPERSEDING INFORMATION
MARK NICHOLS and GREGORIO CERVANTES, aka Greg Cervantes,	[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d): Illegal Conduit Campaign Contributions; 18 U.S.C. § 2: Causing an Act to be Done]
Defendants.	

The United States Attorney charges:

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

At all times relevant to the Second Superseding Information:

1. The Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") governs contributions to candidates and their campaign committees in federal elections. Under FECA, it is illegal for one person to (a) contribute more than \$1000 to a particular candidate in either the primary or general federal election, or (b) make a contribution in the name of another or, in other words, to make disguised contributions through a "conduit" contributor.

JMR:jmr

- 2. Under FECA, the Federal Elections Commission ("FEC") is the agency of the United States responsible for: (a) receiving the required campaign contribution and disbursement reports, (b) making these reports available to the public, and (c) investigating violations of the law concerning illegal campaign contributions to federal candidates.
- 3. Under FECA, a candidate for federal office must establish a political committee through which funds can be raised. The treasurer of a federal candidate's political committee is required to file a periodic report with the FEC disclosing, among other things, the name of each contributor who contributed more than \$200 during the reporting period, and the amount of their contribution. Federal law requires these reports to be made available to the public throughout the campaign and thereafter.
- 4. Defendant MARK NICHOLS was Chief Executive Officer of the Cabazon Band of Missions Indians in Riverside County, California (the "Tribe"). In this capacity, defendant MARK NICHOLS supervised employees of the Tribe, including employees of the Fantasy Springs Casino, which was owned and operated by the Tribe.
- 5. Defendant GREG CERVANTES was Customer Service Representative of the Tribe in Riverside County, California.
- 6. President William Jefferson Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., were candidates for President and Vice President of the United States during the campaign preceding the 1996 federal election. "The Clinton/Gore '96 Primary Committee" ("Clinton/Gore Committee") was a political committee authorized to support their candidacies, and the committee was subject to the reporting provisions and the campaign financing limitations of FECA.

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COUNT ONE

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about June 17, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant MARK NICHOLS knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about June 16, 1995, defendant NICHOLS, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in Greg Cervantes's name.

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COUNT TWO

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about June 29, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant MARK NICHOLS knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about June 29, 1995, defendant NICHOLS, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in David Riemer's name.

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COUNT THREE

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about September 20, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant MARK NICHOLS knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about September 20, 1995, defendant NICHOLS, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in Anne Riemer's name.

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COUNT FOUR

[2 U.S.C. §§ 441(f), 437g(d); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

On or about June 17, 1995, in Riverside County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant GREG CERVANTES knowingly and willfully caused to be contributed to a federal campaign committee, illegal contributions aggregating more than \$2,000 in a calendar year. Specifically, on or about July 27, 1995, defendant CERVANTES, having previously caused at least \$2,000 in conduit contributions to be made to the Clinton-Gore '96 Primary Committee on behalf of the Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, knowingly and willfully caused the tribe to make an additional \$1,000 conduit contribution in Beartice Cervantes's name.

ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS United States Attorney

GEORGE S. CARDONA
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

KIMBERLY A. DUNNE
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Public Corruption & Government Fraud
Section

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, VERONICA BARAJAS, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or employed in Los Angeles County, California; that my business address is Office of United States Attorney, United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012; that I am over the age of eighteen years, and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for the Central District of California who is a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, at whose direction the service by mail described in this certificate was made; that on October 12, 1999, I deposited in the United States mail in the United States Courthouse at 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, in the aboveentitled action, in an envelope bearing the requisite postage, a copy of:

NOTICE OF FILING OF ORIGINAL PLEA AGREEMENT

Addressed to: ROBERT L. CORBIN, ESQ. 601 West Fifth Street

12th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90017-2025

at his/her/their last known address, at which place there is a delivery service by United States mail

This Certificate is executed on October 12, 1999, at Los Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

VENOVICA BARAJAS

1	
2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
3	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
4	
· 5	HONORABLE AUDREY B. COLLINS, JUDGE PRESIDING
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8	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,) Plaintiff,)
9) vs.) No. CR 98-642 ABC
10) MARK NICHOLS,
11	GREGORIO CERVANTES,) Defendants.)
12	<u>berendancs.</u>
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17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Change of Plea
18	Los Angeles, California Thursday, October 14, 1999
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23	DAVID A. SALYER, CSR,RMR Official Court Reporter License No. 4410
24	255 East Temple Street

255 East Temple Street Room 1179-E Los Angeles, California 90012 P: 213/687-4148 * F: 213/687-0576

1	APPEARANCES:
2	FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
3	OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY BY: Jeffrey Rawitz, AUSA
4	1300 United States Courthouse 312 North Spring Street
5	Los Angeles, California 90012 213/894-2302
6	FOR THE DEFENDANT:
7	STANLEY I. GREENBERG, ESQ.
8	ATTORNEY AT LAW 11845 West Olympic Boulevard
9	Suite 1000 Los Angeles, California 90067
10	310-444-5999 &
11	CORBIN & FITZGERALD, LLP BY: ROBERT L. CORBIN, ESQ.
12	601 West Fifth Street 12th Floor
13	Los Angeles, CA 90071-2025 213-612
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1999 1 1:30 P.M. 2 Item number one, CR 98-642 ABC, United THE CLERK: 3 States of America versus Mark Nichols and Gregorio Cervantes. 4 Counsel, your appearances? MR. RAWITZ: Good afternoon, your Honor. 6 Rawitz for the United States. 7 MR. GREENBERG: Good afternoon. Stanley Greenberg 8 9 present with Mr. Nichols. We are here for a change of plea and we are ready 10 to proceed. - 11 MR. CORBIN: Good afternoon. Robert Corbin 12 appearing with Mr. Cervantes. 13 THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. 14 15 As you indicated, this matter is here for a change of plea. And the Court has received notice of filing of the 16 17 original plea agreement and copies of the plea agreement on each defendant, and the Court has had an opportunity to 18 19 review that and they certainly appear to be in order. Although there are a lot of similarities, I think 20 it would probably be better to take each plea separately. 21 22. As to Mr. Nichols, it's the Court's understanding, 23 Mr. Nichols, that this afternoon you wish to plead guilty to 24 counts 1, 2 and 3; is that correct?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS:

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you rise so the Court can hear your answers and go up to the podium because this is a very serious matter. I do handle changes of plea under oath. And at this time the clerk will arraign and swear you as to counts 1, 2 and 3.

We will have plenty of opportunity during the plea colloquy for you to ask any questions and if you need more time to speak to your attorney, please let me know because your answers will be under oath and if it is determined that you willfully lied to the Court, it could be a basis for perjury prosecution.

So we will ask that Mr. Nichols be sworn as to counts 1, 2 and 3.

THE CLERK: Thank you, your Honor.

Is Mark Nichols your true and correct name?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.

THE CLERK: Is it your intention at this time to withdraw you previous not guilty plea to counts 1, 2 and 3 of the indictment?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.

THE CLERK: The Court will now ask you some questions regarding the plea.

(Defendant sworn.)

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.

THE CLERK: Thank you.

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1 MR. GREENBERG: Excuse me, your Honor. I think I need to clarify one thing. 2 3 He will not be changing his plea as to counts 1, 2 and 3 of the indictment but entering quilty pleas to Count 1, 5 2 and 3 of the second superseding information. THE COURT: That's correct. 6 I should indicate I have received the second 7 8 superseding information which was filed October 12th. 9 Have the defendants been arraigned on this information? 10 MR. GREENBERG: - 11 THE COURT: All right. 12 Then let's start there. 13 14 As to Mr. Nichols and Mr. Cervantes, there is a 15 second superseding information. 16 And the charges as to count 1 are different than 17 they are certainly than they are in the preceding informations or indictments. 18 19 Count 1 charging Title 2 United States Code Section 20 441(f) and 437g, subsection D, and Title 18 United States 21 Code Section 2. 22 Now, you do have a right, both of you, Mr. Nichols and Mr. Cervantes, to have me read out the entire 23 information. 24 25 Do you give up that right?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes. 1 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: Yes. 2 THE COURT: You also have a right to be advised as 3 to your constitutional rights, the same rights that we will 4 be going over in a few moments as to your plea. 5 You do have a right to read out to you all of your 6 7 rights before we proceed any further on the second superseding information. 8 9 Do you give up your right to have me read those separately because I will cover them in a few minutes as to 10 your plea? - 11 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes. 12 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: Yes. 13 THE COURT: All right. And as to your pleas I do 14 15 understand that at this time, as I stated, Mr. Nichols, you plan to plead guilty to counts 1, 2 and 3 and, Mr. Cervantes, 16 17 as to count 4 in which you are charged would you be pleading 18 guilty; is that correct? 19 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: That is correct, your Honor. 20 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes. 21 THE COURT: Now, before we go any further, 22 Mr. Nichols, how old are you? DEFENDANT NICHOLS: 41. 23 24 THE COURT: And how far did you to go school? DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Approximately three years in 25

college.

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THE COURT: All right.

If you do have questions as we go along, just let me know and I will be happy to give you time to speak with your attorney or if you have questions for me, you can certainly address them to me.

I also have to ask your indulgence, unfortunately I have a bit of a cold. We will try to get through this without too much sneezing or coughing.

First of all, I will go over with you the charges to which you are pleading this afternoon, advise of your constitutional rights, go over the consequences of the plea which are included in the plea agreement and we will explore the plea agreement somewhat and then we will go over sentencing factors.

First of all, to plead guilty to counts 1 through 3, in order to be found guilty of violating Title 2 of the United States Code Section 441(f) and 437g (d) and Title 18 United States Code Section 2 all of which are charged in counts 1, 2 and 3 the Government would have to prove, number one, that you knowingly and willfully, number two, made or caused to be made a contribution in connection with an election to any federal political office or in connection with any primary election, convention or caucus held to select candidates for any federal political office, number 3,

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in the name of another person, number 4, with said illegal contributions aggregating \$2,000 or more during the calendar year.

Do you understand that is what you are charged with in those counts?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.

THE COURT: Next I would like to advise you of your constitutional rights which you will be giving up if you plead guilty today.

First, you have a right to a speedy and public trial.

You have the right to be tried by a jury and you have the right to make the Government prove its case against you beyond a reasonable doubt to all 12 jurors.

In other words, you can only be convicted if the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements that I just went over when explaining the charge to you.

If the case went to trial, you have the right to confront and cross-examine all the witnesses called to testify against you and you would have the right to subpoena witnesses to testify on your own behalf.

You have the right to be represented by an attorney throughout the proceedings. If you cannot afford an attorney, one would be appointed for you free of charge.

If the case went to trial, you would have a right 1 2 to testify on your own behalf. However, you could not be compelled to testify or to incriminate yourself in any way. 3 And if the case did go to trial and you decided not 4 5 to testify, that fact could not be used against you in the trial. 6 But if I accept your plea today, you are 7 incriminating yourself because you are admitting your guilt. 8 9 In essence, you are testifying against yourself. There won't be a trial and I will sentence you 10 based on your plea today. - 11 Have you discussed this case and these rights with 12 13 your attorney? 14 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes, I have. 15 THE COURT: Do you understand your constitutional 16 rights? 17 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes, I do. 18 THE COURT: And do you understand that if you plead 19 guilty, you are giving up all of these rights, including your 20 right to a jury trial? 21 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes, I do. 22 THE COURT: And understanding that, do you give up 23 these rights? 24 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes. 25 THE COURT: At this time I would like to go over

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the consequences of your plea as covered in the plea agreement at paragraph 5.

The statutory maximum sentence that the Court could impose for each count of conviction under Title 2 of the United States Code Section 441 (f) 437g subsection D and Title 18 United States Code Section 2 and 18 United States Code Section 3571 (b) (3) is one year of incarceration, an additional one year supervised release, a fine of \$100,000 and a special assessment of \$25 for each count of conviction or five years probation, a fine of \$100,000 per count, and a special assessment of \$25 per each count of conviction.

The Court can also order you to pay the costs of your imprisonment should the Court impose any. And you agree to pay a special assessment at or before the time of sentencing.

I have mentioned the term "supervised release."

That is a period of time following your release from imprisonment and certain conditions and terms are imposed upon you.

If those are violated, any of them, then you could be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release which could obviously result in your serving a total term in prison greater than the statutory maximum of one year which was just mentioned.

Under the terms of this agreement, actually, the

plea agreement states that you cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment or supervised release.

I believe that would relate to paragraph 10 in which it's agreed you are not be sentenced to a period of imprisonment although imprisonment may be ordered as a condition of probation.

In addition in your particular case, one of the consequences is covered at paragraph 8 that the parties have agreed that as part of your sentence you would be ordered to pay a total criminal fine in the amount of \$200,000 and the plea agreement does set out the method under which that would be paid and that if you didn't pay, that would constitute a breach of the agreement allowing the Government to reinstate the underlying first superseding indictment.

Do you understand those consequences?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: I should also indicate that if you are on probation, parole or supervised release in some other case, different from this one, your plea today could result in a violation of that probation, parole or supervised release in the other case and that could result in your serving more time in that other case.

Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.

THE COURT: Another consequence that appears to be

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a consequence arising out of the plea agreement is that you 1 have agreed to submit to the federal election campaigns 2 jurisdiction to cooperate in its compliance proceedings and 3 this has to do with the resolution of administrative and civil liabilities at paragraph 9. 5 And there is an agreement within paragraph 9 that 6 you and the Government have agreed to an administrative and 7 civil fine of \$56,000 as an appropriate civil disposition but 8 9 as part of the plea agreement is not binding on the FEC. Do you understand those consequences? 10 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes, I do. _ 11 THE COURT: All right. 12 If I haven't mentioned it, paragraph 12, another 13 consequence is that there is a mandatory special assessment 14 of \$25 for each count which you agree to pay on the date of 15 16 sentencing. 17 Do you understand that consequence? 18 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. THE COURT: Have you had sufficient time to discuss 19 20 this charge, possible punishment, facts and defenses with Mr. Greenberg, your counsel? 21

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: We have discussed t

THE COURT: We have discussed the plea agreement already quite a bit.

Have you read this plea agreement?

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Is this your signature at page 9, just 2 THE COURT: 3 above your name? DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes. 4 THE COURT: Do you understand that the Court is not 5 a party to the agreement? In other words, you understand I 6 haven't signed it. 7 If you look at the signature page, the Court hasn't 8 9 I'm not a party to it and I haven't agreed to the I haven't seen the terms until I got it the other 10 terms. _ 11 day. Do you understand that? 12 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes. 13 THE COURT: I also noticed that there is a waiver 14 15 of some appeal rights. Paragraph 16, normally you have the right to appeal 16 any sentence imposed by the Court but in this paragraph you 17 are knowingly and voluntarily giving up your right to appeal 18 any sentence imposed by the Court as long as the sentence is 19 within the statutory maximum authorized by law and as long as 20 21 it comports with the sentence set forth in this agreement.

DEFENDANT NICHOLS:

Yes.

So do you understand that you are giving up some appeal rights?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.

MR. GREENBERG: May I have one moment, your Honor?

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THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GREENBERG: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. RAWITZ: There is one additional consequence I would like to point out the court.

It's under heading 10, your Honor, probation.

The parties have agreed that a minimum of three years probation would be imposed by the Court. The statute provides for no more than five. There is a range there and three years is the minimum.

The only other clarification I would like to make, your Honor, is to a certain extent while the Court is not a signator to the agreement, the Court is, to the extent indicated in agreement, because it's an 11(e)(1)(c) agreement bound by the terms of the agreement, to the extent they are agreed to in the plea agreement.

So it's unusual to that extent, your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. The Court understands it to be that way, that I'm not a signator. I haven't signed off on this agreement and I'm not bound by it, but the Court has the option to accept the plea agreement as it is or to reject it. And if I reject it totally, then you are not bound by it at all and everybody would just go back to square one.

If I accept it, I accept it as written and I would not deviate from the consequences that are laid out.

Is that everyone's understanding?

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MR. GREENBERG: That is our understanding, your Honor.

MR. RAWITZ: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

I don't remember if I asked you this.

Do you need any more time to discuss the plea agreement with your attorney?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: No, thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Now, when we you come back for sentencing in January normally the sentencing is determined under the sentencing guidelines and you don't really know what you are sentence will be. This is, as was just stated, a little bit different in that the consequences are laid out and the agreed-upon sentence is laid out here.

So are you familiar with all of the paragraphs that discuss the consequences here paragraph 8 on the fine, paragraph 9, the resolution of the civil liabilities, paragraph 10 which was previously referred to, that you won't even be sentenced to a period of imprisonment although it may be ordered as a term of probation, that you will be sentenced to no less than three years probation, that the Government could argue for a sentence including up to five years probation and that the Government could argue for any of the discretionary conditions listed in 3563(b), including imprisonment for a period of not to exceed one year, that

there is no forfeiture and the special assessment? 1 Are you familiar with all of those components of 2 the sentence? 3 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes, I am. 4 MR. RAWITZ: There is only one additional paragraph 5 I would draw the Court's attention to and that is paragraph 6 7, your Honor. This is a case, based on the unique nature of the 8 statute involved, the parties have agreed that there is no 9 analogous guideline that is going to be used. It will come 10 into play -- it may well come into play to the extent the _ 11 12 Government argues for a term of incarceration and that is, again, somewhat unusual. So I just wanted to draw the 13 Court's attention to it. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 16 And you are aware of paragraph 7, Mr. Nichols? DEFENDANT NICHOLS: 17 18 THE COURT: Which was just referred to on the applicable guidelines? 19 20 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes. 21 THE COURT: All right. Now, are we still sending 22 this matter out the probation; is that anticipated? 23 MR. RAWITZ: That is correct, your Honor. 24 The Court still has discretion not really regarding

the fine but to the extent that there is any detention or

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community service, any combination that would be for the Court to determine consistent with the agreement and the pre-sentence report would be helpful to the Court in that regard.

THE COURT: I'm sure it will.

Mr. Nichols, this will be going out to the probation department. You will have an opportunity to be interviewed.

The probation department will prepare a report containing its recommendations and a lot of information from the Court.

The Court will consider that report and any additional papers from the parties and then the Court will make its determination as to whether the Court will concur with the conditions of the plea agreement or not.

Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.

THE COURT: And at that time, of course, I will make the final determination as to whether or not to accept the plea agreement.

That is because right now I don't know if you might have a prior criminal history that we are all just not aware of, so it would be premature for me to decide that today.

But if I did reject the plea agreement, then as I said, you would have an opportunity to withdraw your plea and

1	change it at that time.
2	Do you understand that?
3	DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.
4	THE COURT: I do have to advise you, although it
5	may not apply to you, that if you are not a United States
6	citizen there could be immigration consequences to your plea
7	such as deportation.
8	Do you understand that?
9	DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.
10	THE COURT: All right. Also is this considered a
11	felony plea?
12	MR. RAWITZ: No, your Honor.
13	THE COURT: All right.
14	Has anyone made any promises, threats or used force
15	against you or your family in order to get you to plead
16	guilty today?
17	DEFENDANT NICHOLS: No.
18	THE COURT: Have you taken any medication or drugs
19	of any kind within the last 48 hours?
20	DEFENDANT NICHOLS: No.
21	THE COURT: The Court does find that Mr. Nichols is
22	in full possession of his faculties.
23	Now, at this time
24	MR. GREENBERG: I'm sorry, I didn't hear what you
25	said just then.

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THE COURT: I just said he's in full possession of his faculties.

Now, at this time I would ask the Government,

Mr. Rawitz, to recite the factual basis that the Government
would prove if the case went to trial.

And, Mr. Nichols, I will ask you to listen carefully because I will ask you if this is true and correct.

MR. RAWITZ: Your Honor, as your Honor can see, on pages 10 through 12, of, I believe, the plea agreement it's a very extensive factual basis.

I would ask that the Court inquire of Mr. Nichols whether he has reviewed the facts as they are set forth on pages 10 through 12 and agrees that the Government could prove those facts. The Government represents to the Court that it can, in fact, prove those facts. That may save some time.

There will be a fair amount of overlap, actually, between the facts in Mr. Nichol's plea agreement and Mr. Cervantes.

I can, if your Honor would like, just to summarize what the evidence is as opposed reading the entirety of the stipulated facts into the record whatever is the Court's preference.

THE COURT: Why don't we do both.

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First let me ask you, Mr. Nichols, if you have read the very detailed factual basis at pages 10 through 12.

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.

THE COURT: And having read that, is everything that is stated in there about you, your conduct and your intent true and correct?

DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. I do think it would be good for the record to just summarize, if you could, Mr. Rawitz.

MR. RAWITZ: Thank you very much.

As your Honor is aware, after our many pleadings in this case, Mr. Nichols is the chief executive of the Cabazon Band of which one of the business interests is the casino out in the desert.

Mr. Nichols in that role wanted to make contributions in this case to President Clinton and vice-president Gore's campaign. At that time they were not in the offices but merely running for the offices. He was aware there were limits of \$1,000 in the primary and \$1,000 in the general election to make those contributions and in an effort to circumvent those limits Mr. Nichols agreed to or caused various members or employees of the casino which he supervised to make contributions on the representation that they would then be reimbursed for those contributions and that is, in fact, what happened, your Honor.

It happened regarding the Goodmans, which is reflected on page 11. They made contributions of \$1,000 each on June 15 and were reimbursed.

Often what happened, your Honor, was Mr. Goodman was an employee of the casino and in various instances either an advance or a loan was made as an advance that was undeserved of the loan that was subsequently forgiven and then there were actually reimbursements for those contributions and that what happened regarding Mr. Goodman.

Mr. Nichols also caused Mr. Cervantes to make a \$1,000 contribution which on June 17th which he caused the casino to reimburse him for on June 19.

David and Ann Marie Riemer, R-I-E-M-E-R made contributions on June 29th and September 15th, respectively, and were thereafter reimbursed by Mr. Nichols who caused or tried to issue a check to Mr. Riemer. He was an employee of the casino to reimburse for those contributions knowing that he was prohibited from doing so.

During the course of October 1994 through December of 1995 Mr. Nichols caused 28 conduit contributions to be made to President Clinton's campaign knowing that that conduct constituted a violation of Title 2, USC sections 441 (f) and 437g, subsection D, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Again, Mr. Nichols, having heard that summary, is

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1	the summary excuse me. Is the summary, not only the
2	facts, but your conduct and intent as stated true and
3	correct?
4	MR. GREENBERG: May we have a moment, your Honor?
5	THE COURT: Yes.
6	MR. GREENBERG: I think we heard one or two things
7	I need to talk to him about.
8	One thing I know that Mr. Rawitz said is that
9	President Clinton and Gore were not in office. At the time
10	they were running for a second term.
11	THE COURT: All right.
12	MR. GREENBERG: Also if I may, I want to clarify
13	two areas and I think Mr. Nichols will adopt it.
14	Mr. Rawitz made reference to the Goodman's, Don and
15	Elaine Goodman getting some advances.
16	I think in actuality what happened was Mr. Goodman
17	was given bonuses and he used some of that money to make the
18	contribution.
19	And the other thing is it was two candidates beyond
20	just President Clinton and Mr. Gore. It was some other
21	candidates who were also set forth.
22	I think with that clarification I think Mr. Nichols
23	will adopt what Mr. Rawitz has just said.
24	THE COURT: Is that clarification accepted
25	Mr. Rawitz?

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MR. RAWITZ: Let me just respond briefly.

The bonuses, to the extent they were called bonuses, were not, in fact, bonuses. They were reimbursements. So if it was a bonus or a reimbursement characterized as a bonus as opposed to an advance, I have no objection to the changing of the terminology so long as the understanding is the bonus was given for the purpose of reimbursing in this case Mr. Goodman.

The other issue regarding various campaigns, we need to be specific.

The second superseding information only addresses campaign contributions made to -- Mr. Greenberg is correct -- the president's and vice-president's campaign.

That is important. I make that clarification because the statute speaks to limits vis-a-vis a particular candidate and you have to give in excess of \$2,000 to a particular candidate.

And so the only candidates or the only campaign which is indicated in the second superseding information is that of the president and the vice-president. It is certainly true that of the other 28 conduit contributions, they were made to various senators and house of representatives and the house of representative candidates, but those contributions which are addressed in the second superseding information only address those made to the

president and vice-president. 1 2 THE COURT: Is that true? DEFENDANT: That is correct. 3 THE COURT: I just wanted to make sure that was 4 5 true. All right. So that that is accepted, then, that it 6 7 is true. This superseding information is only the Clinton-Gore campaigns that are at issue. 8 9 Any dispute as to the nature of the bonus as it has now been characterized by the Government? Is that accepted 10 as characterized by the Government? - 11 12 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: THE COURT: All right. Then, again, as to the 13 summary and the full layout of the facts and the plea 14 agreement Mr. Nichols, are you pleading guilty because, in 15 truth and in fact, you are guilty of the conduct alleged in 16 17 counts 1, 2, and 3? DEFENDANT NICHOLS: 18 Yes. 19 THE COURT: Is the Government satisfied as to the factual basis? 20 21 MR. RAWITZ: Thank you very much, your Honor. 22 are. 23 THE COURT: And Mr. Greenberg, have you conferred 24 with and advised your client regarding his plea? 25 MR. GREENBERG: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you believe it's being made freely 1 and voluntary with a full understanding of the nature and the 2 consequences? 3 MR. GREENBERG: I do. Do you concur there is a factual basis? THE COURT: 5 6 MR. GREENBERG: I do. THE COURT: And, Mr. Nichols, are you satisfied with the performance and representation of your attorney, 8 9 Mr. Greenberg? DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Yes, very much so. 10 THE COURT: And having in mind all that we have - 11 discussed this afternoon regarding the plea of quilty to 12 counts 1, 2 and 3, how do you wish to plead? 13 14 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Guilty, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: The Court finds there is a factual 16 basis for the plea. 17 The Court finds Mr. Mark Nichols has entered his 18 plea freely and voluntarily with a full understanding of the 19 nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea and the plea should be entered if the Court accepts it 20 21 at the time of sentencing. 22 Sentencing, if it's convenient with everyone, would 23 be January 3rd of 2000. MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, could we push that more 24 25 into the middle of -- wait a minute.

Could we get that into the week following, please? 1 THE COURT: January 10th? 2 That would be fine. MR. GREENBERG: 3 THE COURT: Sentencing, then, will be January 10th 4 2,000 at 1:30 p.m. 5 And, Mr. Nichols, you are ordered to return at that 6 7 date and time and unless the Court continues it on stipulation without further court order, you must return Ω January 10th at 1:30 p.m. 9 Thank you. 10 DEFENDANT NICHOLS: Thank you. _11 12 THE COURT: That concludes the plea as to Mr. Nichols. 13 14 Mr. Cervantes? 15 Mr. Cervantes, my understanding at this time is you 16 wish to change your -- you haven't entered a plea. 17 My understanding as to the new second superseding information as to count 4 you wish to enter a plea of guilty; 18 is that correct? 19 20 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: Yes. THE COURT: Again, I would like to do these matters 21 under oath. 22 23 You will have plenty of time to discuss the issues 24 as we go along with your counsel, but the Court will ask you questions and you will be answering under oath. So if it 25

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were determined you had willfully lied to the Court, you 1 could be subject to prosecution for perjury. 2 I will ask that Mr. Cervantes be sworn as to count 3 4 4. THE CLERK: 5 Count 4. Thank you. 6 7 Is Gregorio Cervantes your true and correct name? 8 **DEFENDANT CERVANTES:** Yes. 9 THE CLERK: Is it your intention at this time to withdraw your previous entry of plea as to count 4 of the 10 original indictment and enter a plea to count 4 of the second _ 11 12 superseding information? MR. CORBIN: He is going to enter a plea of guilty 13 to count 4 of the second superseding information. 14 15 THE CLERK: Right. 16 MR. CORBIN: Which has no relationship at all to 17 any of the prior indictments. 18 THE CLERK: But are you not withdrawing your 19 previous pleas of not guilty to the initial indictment? DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I am. 20 21 MR. CORBIN: Well, he is not -- he is not 22 withdrawing his previously entered pleas of not guilty 23 because count 4 in the second superseding information would 24 be different and no relationship.

THE CLERK: Thank you.

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The Court will now ask you some questions regarding 1 2 your plea. Please raise your right hand. 3 (Defendant sworn.) 4 **DEFENDANT CERVANTES:** Yes. 5 THE CLERK: Thank you. 6 Mr. Cervantes, how old are you, sir? 7 THE COURT: DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I'm 38. 8 And how far did you get in school? 9 THE COURT: DEFENDANT CERVANTES: Associate of arts degree from 10 the College of the Desert in Palm Desert, a B.A. from the _ 11 12 University of Riverside and some public policy work in University of Georgetown, Washington D.C. 13 If you have any questions as we go 14 THE COURT: through the process, please feel free to ask for a moment to 15 16 speak with your attorney or you can ask me if the question is one you would like to ask me directly. 17 First, I would like to make sure you understand 18 what you're pleading to and then go through your 19 constitutional rights and the consequences of your plea and 20 then review the sentencing proceeding. 21 22 You have agreed to plead guilty to count 4 of the second superseding information that charges you with 23

violating Title 2, United States Code section 441(f) and

437g, subsection D, and also Title 18, United States Code

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Section 2 by causing the making of illegal conduit campaign contributions.

Now, in order to be found guilty of violating those sections the Government would have to prove at trial that you must have, one, knowingly and willfully, two, made or caused to be made a contribution in connection with an election to any federal political office or in connection with any primary election, convention or caucus held to select candidates for any federal political office, three, in the name of another person, four, with said illegal contributions aggregating \$2,000 or more during the calendar year.

Do you understand that is what you will be pleading guilty to?

DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

I would like to advise you of your constitutional rights because you will be giving them up if you plead guilty to count 4.

You have a right to a speedy and public trial.

You have a right to be tried by a jury and you have the right to make the Government prove the case against you beyond a reasonable doubt to all 12 jurors, which means the Government would have to prove all of those elements we have just went through to all 12 jurors.

You have the right to be represented by an

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attorney. If you can't afford an attorney, one would be appointed for you free of charge.

You have the right to confront and cross-examine all the witnesses who would be called to testify against you and you have the right to have witnesses subpoenaed to testify on your behalf.

You have the right to testify yourself if the case went to trial, but you couldn't be compelled to testify against yourself or to incriminate yourself in any way. And if you decided not to testify at trial, the Government couldn't use that against you in trial.

If I accept your plea, today, you are, in fact, testifying against yourself. You're incriminating yourself because you're admitting your guilt, so you are giving up your right against self-incrimination.

There won't be a trial and I will sentence you based on your plea today.

Have you discussed this case and these rights with your attorney, Mr. Corbin?

DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I have.

THE COURT: Do you understand your constitutional rights?

DEFENDANT CERVANTES: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if you plead guilty, you are giving up these rights, including the right

1 | to a jury trial?

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DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I do.

THE COURT: Understanding that, do you give up these rights?

DEFENDANT CERVANTES: That is correct.

THE COURT: I would like to go over the consequences of the plea as set forth in the plea agreement.

Starting at paragraph 5, the statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a conviction under Title 2 USC section 441(f) and 437g, subsection D, and Title 18 United States Code -- and Title 18 United States Code 3571 (b)(3) is one year incarceration and additional one year of supervised release, a fine of \$100,000, and a special assessment of \$25, five years probation, a fine of \$100,000 and a special assessment of \$25.

The Court can also order you to pay the costs of imprisonment and you agree to pay the special assessment at or before the time of sentencing.

If you are placed on supervised release and violate any of those conditions, you could be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release.

However, in this plea agreement at paragraph 10 the parties have agreed that if the Court accepts it you shall not be sentenced to any term of incarceration, confinement in a punitive confinement center, home detention or community

service.

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Instead, according to paragraph 11, in this plea agreement, the parties have agreed you would be placed on one-year probation as part of your sentence in this case.

In paragraph 12 the parties have agreed there will be no forfeiture and in paragraph 13 you do agree to pay a special assessment of \$25 to the clerk of the Court from the date of sentencing.

It's also agreed upon in the plea agreement that there is no guideline that is really analogous to this and that the applicable guideline would be 2X5.1.

And another consequence is paragraph 8 as part of your sentence you shall be ordered to pay a total criminal fine in the amount of \$13,000. And if you fail to make the payment required as part of this agreement, then that would be a breach of -- constitute a breach of the agreement, allowing the Government to reinstate the underlying first superseding indictment. And it would also constitute a violation of your probation.

Another consequence is the resolution of administrative and civil liabilities with the Federal Election Commission at paragraph 9 in which you are agreeing to submit to the FEC's jurisdiction and to cooperate and that an appropriate administrative and civil fine is \$26,000. But this part of the plea agreement is not binding to the FEC.

agreement quite a bit.

Still, you are agreeing to tender a check in that amount at 1 2 the time you enter your plea of guilty. Those appear to be the consequences. 3 Do you understand all of those consequences and 4 5 terms? DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I do, your Honor. 6 If you should be -- excuse me, if you 7 THE COURT: 8 should be on probation, parole or supervised release in some other, different case, your plea to this matter could result 9 in another court finding that you have violated that 10 probation or parole or supervised release which could result - 11 12 in your serving more time in some other case. Do you understand that? 13 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I do. 14 15 Your Honor, I have no other case pending. I understand. I'm just required to go 16 THE COURT: through quite a few of these things. 17 18 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: Thank you. THE COURT: Do you feel you have had sufficient 19 20 time to discuss the charges, the possible punishment, all of the consequences and the defenses with your attorney, 21 Mr. Corbin? 22 23 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I have, your honor. 24 THE COURT: We have already talked about the plea

Have you had a chance to read and study the plea 1 2 agreement as much as you would like to? DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I have. 3 THE COURT: And is this your signature on page 8? 4 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: Yes, it is. 5 THE COURT: Also, as part of the plea agreement the 6 7 Court notes that you are giving up some appeal rights at paragraph 17. 8 Normally, you have the right to appeal any sentence 9 imposed by this Court. 10 You are giving up the right to appeal any sentence -11 in the matter which is determined as long as it's within the 12 statutory maximum authorized by law and comports with the 13 14 sentence set forth in this agreement. 15 Do you understand you are giving up some appeal 16 rights? 17 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I do. THE COURT: Do you need any more time to discuss 18 19 this plea agreement with Mr. Corbin? 20 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I do not. 21 THE COURT: Now, again, the Court will have an 22 opportunity to study a presentence report which is going to 23 be prepared by probation. And you will have an opportunity 24 to see that and the Court can read that and any other papers

from counsel and then at that time the Court will decide

1 whether to accept and go along with the plea agreement or 2 not. But if the Court doesn't accept it, then you would 3 have an opportunity to withdraw your plea. 4 5 Do you understand that? DEFENDANT CERVANTES: Yes, I do. 7 THE COURT: Again, this may not apply to you, but if you are not a United States citizen, there could be 8 immigration consequences from the plea such as deportation. 9 10 Do you understand that? _11 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: 12 THE COURT: Has anyone made any promises, threats 13 or used force against you to get to you sign and accept the 14 terms of this plea agreement? 15 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: No. 16 THE COURT: Have you taken any medication or drugs 17 within the last 48 hours? 18 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I have not. 19 THE COURT: The Court does find that Mr. Cervantes 20 is in full possession of his faculties. 21 And let me ask you, in terms of a factual basis, 22 whether you have read the factual basis at pages 9, 10 and 11 23 of the plea agreement? 24 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I have. 25 THE COURT: And do you agree that everything said

in there about you, your conduct and your intent is true and correct?

DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I do, your Honor. I agree to the factual basis that is stipulated in pages 9, 10 and 11.

THE COURT: All right.

For the Government, the previous oral summary that you gave on the record as to Mr. Nichols, is there anything that you would add to that or anything as to Mr. Cervantes?

MR. RAWITZ: Just very slightly, your Honor.

Mr. Cervantes held a different position which I would note. He was a customer services representative so he was not near the same position of authority as Mr. Nichols.

Mr. Cervantes involvement in this scheme primarily involved causing members of his family to make the contributions.

These people were not employees of -- often not employees of the tribe itself but were family members. And Mr. Cervantes would have the members of his family make the contribution and then agree to have them reimbursed with tribe money and that is, in fact, what happened.

He would consult and confer with Mr. Nichols who would then cause a check to be issued to Mr. Cervantes. The purpose of the check would then be to give and reimburse his family members.

That was true as regarding his and I believe his

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wife's contribution on June 17th for which he was reimbursed on June 19.

Beatrice Cervantes' contribution on July 25th for which she was reimbursed -- for which Mr. Greg Cervantes was reimbursed on the 26th and then he deposited that money into Beatrice Cervantes' bank account on her behalf.

And, again, your Honor, in terms of the amount of contributions in which Mr. Cervantes was involved, it was a smaller amount.

There were 13 conduit contributions in which he was directly involved causing the tribe's money to be used to reimburse the individuals who made the contributions.

Just for your Honor's interest, the figure in the FEC fine is, in fact, double the amount of the contributions that were involved in each respective defendant's conduct. So it's 26,000 because Mr. Cervantes was involved in 13 conduit contributions and 56,000 for Mr. Nichols because he was involved in 28 conduit contributions, just as your Honor understands how we came to those FEC numbers.

That, of course, just so your Honor knew in doing that, is under Title 2 section 441(f) and 437g, subsection D.

THE COURT: Mr. Cervantes, do you agree with the oral summary just given?

DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I do, your Honor.

I want to let you know for the record that my wife

Hortencia was unaware of my conduct during this period. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. The Court understands 3 that. Are you pleading guilty because in truth and fact 4 you are guilty of the conduct charged in count 4? 5 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I am. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 Mr. Corbin, have you had an opportunity to confer with and advise your client regarding this plea? 9 MR. CORBIN: Yes. 10 - 11 THE COURT: Do you believe it's being made freely 12 and with an understanding of the charges and consequences? 13 MR. CORBIN: Yes, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: And do you concur there is a factual 15 basis? 16 MR. CORBIN: Yes. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Cervantes, are you satisfied with 18 the performance and representation of your attorney in this case, Mr. Corbin? 19 20 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: I am. 21 THE COURT: All right. Having in mind all that we have discussed this afternoon regarding your plea of guilty 22 23 to count 4, how do you wish to plead to count 4? 24 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: Guilty, your Honor. 25 The Court finds there is a factual

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basis for the plea and the Court finds that Mr. Gregorio

Cervantes has entered his plea to count 4 fully and

voluntarily with a full understanding of the charge against

him and the consequences.

The plea is entered and the Court will make the final determination whether to accept it at the time of sentencing.

The Court will just indicate the Court would certainly be inclined to accept it absent some surprises in the presentence report.

And I had already set a date of January 10th, 2000 for sentencing.

Is that also agreeable as to Mr. Cervantes?

MR. CORBIN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Cervantes, you are ordered to return January 10th 2000 at 1:30 without further court order or subposena.

MR. CORBIN: Your Honor, just one last thing.

Paragraph 9 of the plea agreement, page four, lines 13 through 17, actually require Mr. Cervantes to pay the \$26,000 to the FEC today.

We have access to the money. We just don't have the money with us.

I have spoken with Mr. Rawitz and he has agreed to excuse us from that aspect of the plea agreement with the

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understanding that the money will be paid in the foreseeable future.

THE COURT: All right. Then that is certainly fine with the Court also.

And similarly, if there is an agreement to Mr. Nichols, that is fine also.

MR. RAWITZ: Your Honor, may I have one moment to confer with counsel?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RAWITZ: Thank you very much, your Honor.

The issue which we were discussing, your Honor, was the pending appeal in this matter.

The Government's opening brief is due on Monday.

We have been staying the briefing schedule in an effort to reach the resolution that we reached today and your honor's clerk was kind enough to get us into court so that we could enter the pleas before Monday which is when the opening brief is due.

The issue arises, your Honor, because the Government would not be inclined to dismiss its appeal until the Court has formally accepted the plea agreements because if we dismiss our appeal and then for some unforeseen reason your Honor rejects the plea agreements, we would be in a bad position in the Ninth Circuit in terms of the appeal.

So we have, it seems like, two options, your Honor.

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One of the options is to request a further stay of the Ninth Circuit until after the date of sentencing at which point your Honor will have opined regarding your decision about accepting the plea. It sounds like absent some extraordinary circumstance you are inclined to do so.

THE COURT: That is correct.

MR. RAWITZ: Or your Honor can indicate that your Honor accepts the plea agreements in which we could file -- I had actually prepared a motion to dismiss which I intend to file either today or tomorrow, which I hadn't anticipated, although it may be procedurally correct the way your Honor is proceeding, that you don't do it until you actually see the presentence report.

I just wanted to raise that for the Court because your Honor does want to, I believe -- did want to know about what is going on with the appeal.

THE COURT: I was very curious.

MR. RAWITZ: Having spent quite a bit of time actually preparing an appeal, I'm sorry I won't be able to file, you know, we have these two options.

And I think it's up to your Honor whether you are comfortable accepting the plea before or after.

THE COURT: You are correct.

Procedurally the Court generally doesn't accept it until after it has seen a report in case there is some

surprise.

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I don't know if the Government has had an opportunity to look into any potential prior criminal history which would be the only thing that would cause the Court to reject it .

I don't know if you can represent to the Court that you have looked into that and that you are comfortable that the defendants don't have any prior criminal history.

MR. RAWITZ: I can promise your Honor in anticipation that I will have to cross-examine these defendants whether they would want to know whether there would be any impeachment evidence that I would be able to use regarding criminal history, and there is -- there are no convictions, to the best of my knowledge, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I will just ask both defense counsel if that is also your representation based on your understanding at this time, Mr. Greenberg?

MR. GREENBERG: Your Honor, the only way I can answer that is I have learned from some bitter experience in the past I can only say, "Not to my knowledge." But whether something is or is not a conviction, I have been surprised in the past, but not to my knowledge.

MR. RAWITZ: Maybe your Honor can inquire to Mr. Nichols as he should surely know.

MR. GREENBERG: That is exactly the problem.

My clients rarely know the correct answer. 1 I realize they may be not attuned to 2 THE COURT: the niceties of felonies and misdemeanors, but is it 3 acceptable for this purpose if I ask them if they have ever 4 been convicted of any criminal offense? 5 6 MR. GREENBERG: May I just have a moment? 7 THE COURT: That is my only concern. And if everyone is comfortable that the answer is no, I would accept 8 9 it. MR. GREENBERG: I am informed by my client that the 10 answer is no. -11 12 THE COURT: And as to Mr. Cervantes? 13 MR. CORBIN: Mr. Cervantes has no priors to my knowledge and he represents to me that he does not know of 14 15 any. 16 THE COURT: Mr. Cervantes, you haven't been 17 convicted of any prior criminal offenses? 18 DEFENDANT CERVANTES: No, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: And the Government's due diligence has 20 not uncovered any such prior convictions? 21 MR. RAWITZ: That is correct. THE COURT: 22 Based upon that, the Court does accept both plea agreements, specifically as to Mr. Nichols and the 23 24 plea agreement as to Mr. Cervantes.

The terms of the plea agreements are acceptable to

the Court. MR. CORBIN: Thank you very much. MR. RAWITZ: We appreciate that. THE COURT: The Court is recess. (End of proceedings.) _11

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the foregoing matter is

transcribed from the stenographic notes taken by me and is a

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true and accurate transcription of the same.

DAVID A. SALYER, CSR, RMR DATED: March 21, 2000 Official Court Reporter License No. 4410